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ARCHITECTURE
AND THE BEHOLDER'S EYE
B.R. TILGHMAN
"Beauty is in the eye of the beholder." Like so many shibboleths
so easily lisped, no one seems to have a very clear idea just what it
means or what its espousal commits us to. There are at least two ways
this slogan can be understood. It may be no more than a reminder
that in discussions of artistic and aesthetic matters that we must expect a good deal of disagreement and that such disagreements can't
be settled by anything like a scientific test. But this is something that
we all know and is not really very interesting. There is, however,
another way to understand the expression that is important and
should be talked about.
The strongest claim that can be gotten out of our platitude is
that every aesthetic and artistic description and judgment of value is
arbitrary and that anyone can say anything he pleases about a work
of art without every having to justify what he says or fear that he may
be mistaken. This view of our relation to art has certain attractions.
It offers a convenient reason for dismissing the critics in the local
paper with whom I disagree and for objecting to the lastest proposal
of the City Commission for civic improvement. It appeals to the eternal democrat in me by giving theoretical support to my desire to be in
matters aesthetic as good a man as my betters. The view, however, is
false and, in addition to being false, it is pernicious. It is pernicious
because it destroys the possibility of any kind of rational discussion of
a very important aspect of our lives and our cultural traditions. It is
pernicious because it destroys the point of art training and art
education: the student can be as good as his master without the ardors of the life drawing class. I shall suggest why it is false.
Perhaps the clearest expression of the "eye of the beholder"
thesis was presented by that enfant terrible of eighteenth century
British philosophy, David Hume. In an essay entitled "Of the Standard of Taste" Hume sketched a theory, "a species of philosophy,
which cuts off all hopes of success" in the attempt to establish a standard of artistic evaluation. According to this theory "Beauty is no
quality in things themselves: It exists merely in the mind which contemplates them; and each mind perceives a different beauty." Hume
explained all this by drawing a distinction, in his eighteenth century
terminology, between judgment and sentiment. A judgment is a
statement that describes things in ·the world and their characteristics.
Judgments are either true or false. A sentiment is merely a feeling
that arises in a person as a reaction to things in the world. Sentiments
are neither true nor false. To say that "beauty is no quality in things
themselves" is simply to say that our artistic descriptions and
evaluations are not "judgments," that is, are not statements about
things whose truth or falsity can be determined. Such utterances are,
instead, the expression of "sentiments," that is, expressions of our

feelings, our likes and dislikes. Thus to say that a building is
beautiful is not to make a statement about the building whose truth
can be tested, but is more like shouting "Hurrah!" in the presence of
the building. (Hume thought he could incorporate this "species of
philosophy" into a theory that would establish an objective basis for
aesthetic evaluation, but all that and why he failed is another story.)
Hume's account misleadingly suggests that the word "beauty" is
just about the only word that plays a role in aesthetic discussion. In
fact, there is scarcely a word in our language that can't at sometime
or another be pressed into doing aesthetic service. To suppose that
every such word is an expression of a feeling is already to put a strain
on the theory. It doesn't take into account the many different kinds of
things we say.
A work of architecture, like any work of art, can have an
aesthetic character and .this character can differ radically from one
building to another. Consider, for example, the spatial character of
the Roman basilica, an architectural form used in early Christian
churches, several of which still survive. A basilica consists of a long
rectangular nave flanked by narrow side aisles often separated from
the nave by an arcade of columns. The aisles were usually dark,
drawing their light from the clerestory of the nave, and consequently
did not compete for attention with the space of the nave. The arcade
of columns served as a decorative addition to the nave and the rhythm
of their spacing helped to emphasize the horizontal movement of the
main space.
The spatial character of the later gothic church and the relations
between the side aisles and the principal space of the nave is quite different from that of the basilica. (Fig. 1, 2.) The side aisles become
much more important in their own right. They have their own windows and are sufficiently lit so that their own structure can be seen.
The proportions of the aisles are generally different from those of the
nave; their scale is smaller, more intimate and more human that the
soaring nave whose vault can be almost lost to sight. The proportions
an!f scale of the gothic aisle provideS_:, a contrast with the space of the
nave rather than merely outlining it as did the basillican aisle.
Descriptions and comparisons such as these are clearly not expressions of our "feelings" about the spaces, but are reports of what
is there to be seen. At this point, however, someone may be puzzled.
. "Of course," he may query, "the nave and the side aisles are there to
be seen, but is the contrast between them or the emphasis one gives to
the other there to be seen?" One may indeed be pardoned for wondering whether contrasts and emphases are objects of sight to be
placed alongside columns, vaultings, and windows.
The puzzlement felt here is to be relieved by a philosophical in19
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vestigation into the very idea of seeing. Seeing turns out to be a
much more complex notion that we tend to think. The complexity of
the notion was first pointed out by the Austrian philosopher Ludwig
Wittgenstein in his book, Philosophical Investigations, first
published in 1953. Wittgenstein introduces us to some of those complexities by means of the figure which can be seen either as a duck or
as a rabbit. (Fig. 3.) By means of this example we are reminded that
in addition to the experience of seeing an object, there is also the experience of seeing it as this or that. This latter kind of seeing is not
arbitrary; we cannot see things in just any way we please. There is, of
course, more than one way to see the figure , but there are limitations.
It can't be seen as a kangaroo. This idea of seeing-·as, I believe, is
very important for aesthetics and our understanding of art.
Our description ofthe basilican aisle emphasizing the movement
of the nave is based upon how we see the interior space rather than
upon any feelings or sentiments we may have. This, I suggest, is an
aesthetic instance of seeing-as; we see the aisle as emphasizing the
horizontal character of the nave. If I am right about this, then one of
the most important tasks of both architectural education and architectural criticism is to teach people what to look for in works of architecture and how to see what there is to be seen. Architectural
beauties are not in the eye of the beholder, but are there for the
beholder's eye to see.
I shall close by begging the reader's pardon for presenting an
over-simplified-and very likely misleading-account of what is
really a frighteningly tangled business. I have not, for example, said
anything about why empirical psychology is not really relevant to the
problems of aesthetics. The attempt to understand the nature of
visual perception is one of the most difficult, and at the same time exciting, projects in contemporary philosphical aesthetics.
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(Fig. I) PlanofOldSt. Peter's, Rome. Begun c. 333A.D.

Suggested further reading;
Roger Scruton, Art and Imagination, Methuen (1974).
_ _ _ _ _ ,The Aesthetics of Architecture, Princeton (1979) .
B.R. Tilghman, The Expression of Emotion in the Visual Arts,
Nijhoff (1970).
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University of Washington. Prof. Tilghman is head of the Philosophy
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(Fzg. 2) Durham Cathedral. Plan and Transverse Section. 1093-1130
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(Fig. 3) The Duck-Rabbit Illusion, depending on how one cares to
interpret the figure.

